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THE INTERPRETERS 
Kenneth L. Karst* 
JUSTICE AS 'TRANSLATION: AN EsSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL 
CRITICISM. By James Boyd White. Chicago: The University of Chi-
cago Press. 1990. Pp. xvii, 301. $29.95. 
In his 1984 book, When Words Lose Their Meaning, James Boyd 
White1 offered us a way of thinking about reading. A text's most im-
portant meanings, he concluded, are to be found in the relations the 
writer and reader establish with each other, and in the larger commu-
nities that the text addresses and helps to shape. In Justice as Transla-
tion, White brings this way of thinking to bear on both the writing and 
the reading of judicial opinions. He analyzes a number of opinions as 
texts in which Justices2 not only compose new meanings for authorita-
tive texts (the Constitution, statutes, judicial precedents) but also offer 
new definitions of themselves, of their intended readers, and of their 
communities (both the legal profession and the larger society). Justice 
as Translation, like White's earlier work, provides a refreshing re-
minder that the humanities, despite the pummelling they have recently 
endured, can be humane. 
In writing an opinion, White says, a Justice necessarily acts as a 
translator, seeking to find and to communicate meaning across cul-
tural boundaries. Sometimes opinion writing closely approaches 
translation in the conventional sense, transmitting meanings across 
ethnic and other divisions in America's multicultural society. But, in 
White's view, opinion writing is a form of translation even when the 
ethnicity ingredient is absent. In every case, the Justice must seek to 
penetrate the culture inhabited by those who wrote the authoritative 
text, and seek to render the meaning of the text in the context of to-
day's issues, embedded as they are in today's culture. The book begins 
with White's views of language and its uses, turns to the judicial opin-
ion as a work of "compositional art," and concludes with some general 
observations on justice as translation. ' 
Who among White's readers will not share his wistfulness as he 
laments the difficulty of finding integration - of the society, of the self 
- in our segmented world? But lamentation is neither the book's 
* David G. Price and Dallas P. Price Professor of Law, University of California, Los Ailge-
les. A.B. 1950, University of California, Los Angeles; LL.B. 1953, Harvard. - Ed. 
I. L. Hart Wright Professor of Law and English, University of Michigan. 
2. All of the opinions analyzed are written by Justices of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
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main mood nor its purpose. The opening chapters mark out a path 
toward integration, one that begins in our perception and uses of lan-
guage. White's examples of the ways in which "we" regard "our" lan-
guage and use it are taken from the writings of academics and 
professionals. He identifies two styles of thinking that impede integra-
tion. First is the notion that language is "transparent or neutral, 
merely a way of pointing to something outside of itself" (p. ix). White 
contests the view that language does its work when it conveys from 
one mind to another "propositions" and "concepts," both of which 
have meanings independent of language. This type of thinking and 
speaking, he argues in Chapter Two, tends to channel us into dis-
course that is assertive, even imperialistic, and thus to divert us from 
an important truth: that our own acculturation severely limits our 
recognition of what counts as a concept and what counts as a reason. 
Language that is abstract and theoretical lends itself to a linear, if-A-
then-B sort of reasoning and inhibits more diffuse, literary ways of 
grasping reality. The language of assertion thus projects its aggressive 
and defensive spirit into the spheres of ethics and justice, with sad 
consequences for a society of many cultures. 
White's second linguistic target is the discourse of economics (ch. 
3) - not the discourse of all economists, but the language of neoclassi-
cal microeconomics prevalent in the "law-and-economics" school. 
This way of talking, White argues, routinely diminishes persons to 
their roles in a system of exchange, regarding them as calculating ma-
chines or objects to be manipulated or both. In Chicagoese, every-
thing - every thing and every value - is interchangeable with 
everything else through the medium of exchange, and competition is 
the pool in which we self-interested maximizers hunt our prey. To the 
economist who says, "This way of speaking is not a picture of the 
world but a set of models, a series of value-free hypotheses about 
human behavior," White responds that the models have a way of tak-
ing over a world view. He uses economic discourse to illustrate one of 
the book's main theses: that language is a way of being and acting in 
the world, of assigning meaning to behavior and thus creating culture. 
And the culture so created is anything but value-free; it promotes a 
view that reduces persons to their wants, their calculated pursuit of 
acquisition, and their competition for dominance. 
Dissatisfied with both the economic and the conceptual-proposi-
tional forms of discourse, White proposes a more literary way of 
thinking about and using language, not just in law but in all our social 
life. He calls this style "intellectual integration" (ch. 1). Its modal 
question is neither "What proposition are you advancing?" nor "How 
much do I get?," but "Who are you [the writer] in this text, who am I 
[the reader], and what kind of conversation do you seek to establish 
between us?" (p. 39). White speaks of integration in a sense that has 
become familiar to all of us in discussing race relations, to embrace a 
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diversity of ways of thinking and talking and writing. In describing 
the reading and writing of judicial opinions as examples of the art of 
composition, he evokes a double meaning that resounds in the words 
"compose" and "composite": "a putting together of two things to 
make out of them a third, a new whole, with a meaning of its own" (p. 
4). To compose a legal text is thus to engage in ethical and political 
action in the world, to make a "gesture" that responds to earlier ges-
tures and may one day evoke the making of new texts, further gestures 
still. 
White's concluding chapters, relating "the activity of translation" 
to law and justice, also draw on his view of reading as the making of a 
new text (chs. 11-12). Translation involves the effort to know and re-
spond to another person and another language, but it also involves the 
assertion of the translator's own self and language. The translator 
must stand between two languages, must inhabit "a culture in the 
space between cultures" (p. 244). A good translator understands the 
impossibility of carrying a text's meaning from one language to an-
other without loss or gain - understands that translation is the art of 
composition, of "integration" in White's sense. What is required is the 
establishment of the right relations between the initial writer and the 
translator, between the two languages (and thus the two cultures), and 
between the translator and the reader of the new, translated text. 
This whole process is "a model of law and justice" (p. 230), exem-
plified in those judicial opinions that deserve to be called excellent. 
For White, legal interpretation is translation, the composing of one 
text in response to another. Like the translator, the interpreter must 
be faithful to the original text and the culture that gave it birth, and 
must take responsibility for interpreting that text's meaning in a new 
context: its application to people in today's culture. Thus, 
"[t]ranslation and justice ... are both ways of talking about right rela-
tions, and of two kinds simultaneously: relations with languages, rela-
tions with people" (p. 233). An opinion - any text - creates "an 
Ideal Reader, the version of himself or herself that it asks each of its 
readers to become" (p. 100). The root question for justice, like the 
root question for translation, is "Who are we to each other?" (p. 233). 
Bracketed by these introductory and closing discussions of lan-
guage, law, and translation are seven chapters in which White elabo-
rates his views through criticism of judicial opinions. To call these 
analyses literary criticism is merely to underscore White's central the-
sis: that law is "at its heart an interpretive and compositional - and 
in this sense a radically literary - activity[,] . . . a way of reading, 
comparing, and criticizing authoritative texts, and, in so doing, . . . 
constituting, through conversation, a community and a culture of a 
certain kind" (p. 91). He sees the judicial opinion as central in this 
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activity, "the main model of thought for the lawyers, ... the represen-
tative legal text" (p. 90). 
What entitles a judicial opinion to be called excellent? White's an-
swer is grounded in his conception of law as "inherently aspirational" 
(p. 137) and therefore a compositional art. The corollary to that con-
ception is an ample view of the authority and responsibility of judges 
to translate authoritative texts by creating new meanings for our time. 
A reader who generally shares those views oflaw and judging (as I do) 
will find much that is congenial in White's analysis of excellence in 
opinion writing. A reader with a more restricted view of the legiti-
macy of judicial lawmaking - say, a Henry Monaghan3 or a Robert 
Bork4 - surely will be harder to persuade. 
Let it not be thought that White ignores the weight of the authori-
tative texts. To the contrary, he chides judges who look past the lan-
guage of the texts to find meaning in the intentions of those who wrote 
them. White agrees that fidelity to a text implies an effort to under-
stand how its meaning was shaped by the context of its times. What 
he rejects is the claim that "the intention of the Framers" should take 
precedence over this effort to interpret the text itself. He makes his 
sharpest attack on this view in a criticism of Chief Justice Taney's 
opinion in the Dred Scott case, 5 which is not only a clear-cut denial of 
the Constitution's aspirational character (pp. 137-38) but an especially 
perverse example of how a Justice can work backward from a conclu-
sion about the case at hand to a premise about "original intent" (pp. 
129-32). 
White does not so much confront the legitimacy question raised by 
the Borks and the Monaghans as make an end run around it. The 
original intent argument, he says, comes into play only when the lan-
guage of the text presents difficulties in the context of today's issue. 
Necessarily, then, invocation of the Framers' supposed intentions is 
itself an interpretive choice guided by the present issue - which, given 
the difficulty of reading the text, the Framers almost certainly did not 
consider. 6 Today's substantive preferences will intrude into this pro-
cess no less than they do in a candid effort to translate the meaning of 
the text for application to today's context. In White's view, reliance 
on the Framers' intent, even when it is sincere, is an evasion of the 
3. See, e.g., Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 117 
(1978); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981). 
4. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990). 
5. Died Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
6. White has much in common with other critics of reliance on "original intent." See, e.g., L. 
LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988); Brest, The Misconceived 
Quest/or the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980); Tushnet, Following the Rules 
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983). 
In this chapter White fits these criticisms into his larger theory of legal interpretation as 
translation. 
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difficulties of reading and the responsibility of a judge to exercise judg-
ment (p. 135). 
A related sin in opinion writing, says White, is the pretense that a 
textual authority (the Constitution, the precedent) is speaking, and not 
the judge. This kind of authoritarian opinion, here exemplified by 
Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 7 not only 
denies the responsibility of the judge as translator/lawgiver, it also de-
nies the possibility that the opinion will engage its readers in the fur-
ther conversation that is the essence of lawmaking in a democracy (ch. 
6). 
In contrast, White applauds Justice Brandeis' famous dissent in 
Olmstead as the product of a judge who is aware of his own potential 
contributions to the growth of the law through sensible interpretation 
of an old text (the fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable 
searches and seizures) to apply to a new condition (communication by 
telephone). Brandeis looks beyond the words of the text to seek its 
deeper principles (the protection of privacy). In writing his opinion in 
language that is accessible to nonlawyers, Brandeis establishes a foot-
ing of equality for himself and his readers, and invites a conversation 
among citizens on the immediate subject (wiretapping by law enforce-
ment officers) and on larger issues as well. 
The authoritarian opinion has no such democratic aims; it sup-
presses all doubt as it suppresses the possibilities for conversation. 
White appreciates not only the candor of a judge who, like Brandeis, 
acknowledges his responsibility as a translator (p. 150), but also the 
candor of a judge who imagines an Ideal Reader with a mind and 
heart, one who is capable of thinking independently about the inter-
pretive issues at hand (pp. 100-01). Such a judge will develop compet-
ing lines of argument, recognizing the force of positions opposed to 
her own and "exposing to view what is most deeply problematic both 
in our resources of legal meaning and in the case upon which they 
bear" (p. 92). In Olmstead, Brandeis remarked that government is a 
teacher;8 White, congratulating Brandeis for respecting the reader's 
capacity for reflection, adds that "Brandeis himself establishes his own 
voice as that of a teacher" (p. 155). 
If Brandeis taught by example in Olmstead, elsewhere he showed 
that he knew how to teach by authoritarian precept. In Whitney v. 
California, 9 for example, he lectured his readers on the true meaning 
of the first amendment and its adopters' purposes. Similarly, Justice 
Black's opinion in the school prayer case of Engel v. Vitale, 10 plainly 
7. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (police wiretapping did not violate fourth amendment because it in-
volved no literal search or material seizure). 
8. 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
9. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
10. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
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addressed to the public at large, is not so much an invitation to a con-
versation as an exposition ex cathedra of what the establishment 
clause compels. Whatever style a Justice may choose, at bottom law is 
command, even when it is commanding tolerance of political outsiders 
or inclusion of religious outsiders. To the Governor of Arkansas who 
sought to keep black children out of Little Rock's Central High 
School, the Supreme Court properly spoke in the stern tones of 
Authority. 11 
Throughout White's analyses of Supreme Court opinions he distin-
guishes sharply between "votes" or "results" on the one hand and the 
opinions of the Justices on the other. Here and there he notes his 
awareness that results are important (pp. 95, 157-58), but repeatedly 
he sounds the theme that "[t]he great contribution of the judicial mind 
is not the vote but the judicial opinion, which gives meaning to the 
vote" (p. 91). When he refers to ''judicial excellence" (p. 93) he means 
excellence in opinion writing: "[I]n an important sense what distin-
guishes the work of a good judge is not the vote but the achievement of 
mind, essentially literary in character, by which the results are given 
meaning in the context of the rest of law, the rest of life" (p. 92). I 
think this view undervalues both the importance of consensus-building 
in the Supreme Court and the doctrinal and political momentum that 
a line of decisions can generate even when they are poorly explained. 
In the margin, by the passage just quoted, I wrote: "Earl Warren?". 
Brown v. Board of Education 12 taught only a minor part of its com-
plex lesson through the medium of its two opinions. Partly because 
Warren was seeking unanimity among the Justices, neither opinion ex-
posed what was problematic in the issues at hand. Brown I focused on 
education and said nothing about dismantling Jim Crow; Brown II an-
nounced the "all deliberate speed" formula as a logistical necessity and 
disingenuously disclaimed any political accommodation. In the next 
few years, when the Court held unconstitutional a great many forms of 
state-sponsored racial segregation, it "spoke" only in grunts: curt or-
ders that offered no explanation beyond citations to Brown L 13 These 
decisions, by their results alone, carried meaning of the weightiest 
kind. They were new "texts" only in the thinnest imaginable sense, 
and yet in the aggregate they amounted to an "acted document"l4 that 
expanded the embrace of our national community. If Brandeis was a 
great judge, so was Warren. 
Henry Hart once recorded his scorn for "shallow-minded lay com-
11. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 
294 (1955) (Brown II). 
13. See, e.g., State Athletic Commn. v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (state·regulated athletic 
contests); New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); 
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches). 
14. C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 10 (1973). 
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mentators" who simply looked at results, "crying, 'One up (or one 
down) for subversion,' 'One up (or one down) for civil liberties,' 'One 
up (or one down) for states' rights.' " 15 He hoped for a time when 
members of the legal profession and others would again understand 
"that reason is the life of the law and not just votes for your side."16 
Ironically, the form of reason Hart had in mind was just the sort of 
propositional reasoning that White seeks to minimize, as opposed to 
the literary way of thinking and talking that enables judges to be trans-
lators and builders of community. In our recent history, "One up for 
civil rights" has had a dynamic - and a moral force - of its own. 
All of us who travel in countries where we lack the language know 
that with good will we can go a long way on gestures that are word-
less. And even those of us who stay home know that actions often 
speak louder than words. The Supreme Court, like other actors both 
individual and corporate, teaches not only by what it says but by what 
it does. 
By putting in a good word for the importance of votes and results I 
mean only to emphasize that judicial opiriions are not the whole story 
when we think about the excellence of judges as teachers, as· commu-
nity-builders, even as translators across cultural boundaries. But this 
reminder, like my comment on Earl Warren, is a note at the margin of 
a book that enlightens at every turn. It is no great failing, after all, 
that Leonardo did not fully develop the background of the Mona Lisa. 
In his portrait of the judge as translator, White practices what he 
preaches. In offering to create a community with his reader, he does 
not demand submission but invites the sort of conversation that can 
lead to new and more inclusive definitions of the larger communities 
they both inhabit. May Ju~tice as Translation find the widest possible 
audience of Ideal Readers. 
15. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 84, 125 (1959). 
16. Id. 
